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We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi-
ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to
borrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive
equilibrium is typically ineﬃcient.
We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs
can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs with
additional funds, eﬃciency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of this
additional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be able
to simultaneously borrow from many diﬀerent lenders operating in it. This makes it possible to
attain eﬃciency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in the
market for bank loans.
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Imagine a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow money from banks in order to fund a
project. Some entrepreneurs have good projects that succeed often, but others have bad projects
that succeed only seldom. Imagine also that each entrepreneur knows the quality of his investment
project, whereas banks do not. This is the typical situation that gives rise to adverse selection.
If banks wish to identify the quality of potential borrowers, they need to design diﬀerent types of
loan contracts that are incentive compatible, so that each one of them attracts a diﬀerent class
of borrowers. In order to attract only entrepreneurs with good projects, banks need to design a
contract that is appealing to this class of borrowers but is unappealing to entrepreneurs with bad
projects: such a contract might, for example, entail small interest payments but require either a
low loan size or a high level of collateral. Since bad projects tend to fail more often, entrepreneurs
with these projects are less willing to provide collateral because they stand to lose it with a greater
probability.
Conventional wisdom suggests that, in a situation like the one just described, the competitive
equilibrium will typically be ineﬃcient. The reason for this is quite intuitive. If loan contracts
are incentive compatible, whatever is oﬀered to borrowers with good projects cannot be so good
as to attract borrowers with bad projects as well. This is similar to saying that the presence of
bad borrowers is imposing an externality, since their choice is limiting — through the incentive
compatibility constraints — what can be oﬀered to borrowers with good projects.
Why can this externality not be internalized in a competitive equilibrium? Good borrowers
could, for example, make the bad loans look more attractive by making side payments to those that
apply to them: this would increase the proﬁts that bad borrowers obtain from their loan contract,
it would decrease their willingness to apply to the good contract, and it would therefore allow good
borrowers to receive a better contract as well. If optimally tailored, these side payments would
induce bad borrowers to internalize the externality that their choice imposes on good borrowers.
Note that these side payments would lead to separation between borrowers — since at equilibrium
good and bad borrowers would be choosing diﬀerent contracts — while at the same time entailing
cross-subsidization from good to bad borrowers.
An eﬃcient arrangement like the one just mentioned, though, cannot be part of a competitive
equilibrium. The reason is that, in such an allocation, diﬀerent borrowers are choosing diﬀerent
contracts and those with good projects are making transfers to those with bad projects. This poses
two related problems. First, when considered individually, banks make positive expected proﬁts
on the loan contracts of good borrowers while they make negative expected proﬁts on the loan
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while withdrawing the bad ones from the market: we will refer to this as the problem of cross-
subsidization. Second, banks can proﬁt by designing deviating contracts that — by implying a lower
degree of cross-subsidization — manage to lure only good entrepreneurs away from the constrained
optimal allocation: we will refer to this as the problem of cream-skimming. Although closely related,
it is useful to consider these two problems separately in order to convey the intuition behind our
main result.
In this paper, we argue that the conventional wisdom for this class of environments rests on
one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is
added, in which entrepreneurs can obtain additional funds beyond those borrowed from banks, we
show that the eﬃcient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. An important characteristic of
this additional market is that — contrary to what is commonly assumed in environments of adverse
selection — it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be able to simultaneously
borrow from many diﬀerent lenders operating in it. In a sense, this requirement is similar to
assuming that individual trades cannot be perfectly monitored in this additional market. We
therefore refer to it as the “non-exclusive market”.
The intuition for our main result is the following: if good entrepreneurs can distinguish them-
selves in the eyes of banks by pledging more collateral, it might be beneﬁcial for them to raise
more of it through the non-exclusive market. Of course, by this market’s very non-exclusive na-
ture, doing so is costly. If entrepreneurs with good projects borrow from it, bad entrepreneurs
have an incentive to also do so in order to beneﬁt from cross-subsidization. Good entrepreneurs,
then, face a trade-oﬀ: borrowing in the non-exclusive market is directly costly because it entails
cross-subsidization of bad borrowers, but it is indirectly beneﬁcial because it allows them to raise
collateral and relax the incentive compatibility constraint in the market for bank loans. We show
that there is an equilibrium of our economy in which this trade-oﬀ is exploited optimally to attain
the eﬃcient levels of investment. This equilibrium is resilient to both of the problems discussed
above. In the ﬁrst place, such an equilibrium entails pooling of all borrowers in the non-exclusive
market and separation of diﬀerent types of borrowers in the bank-loans market: hence, no indi-
vidual contract is expected to yield negative proﬁts and the problem of cross-subsidization is thus
overcome. In the second place, all cross-subsization is undertaken through non-exclusive — and
hence, unmonitored — trades. This drastically reduces the set of proﬁtable deviations that banks
can design to attract only good entrepreneurs, since their bad counterparts can also apply to such
deviations without giving up any transfers that they receive through the non-exclusive market. In
this manner, the problem of cream-skimming is overcome as well.
2One interpretation of the welfare-enhancing role of the non-exclusive market in our equilibrium
is that it allows good entrepreneurs to “buy” an eﬃcient screening technology. In this model, good
entrepreneurs can be screened by distorting their investment or by pledging wealth as collateral:
of the two, the latter is costless whereas the former is not. If the initial problem is one of scarcity
of the resource that allows for eﬃcient screening, an additional market helps by allowing good
entrepreneurs to purchase more of it. Of course, merely enabling entrepreneurs to undertake such
a purchase is not enough: being costly for good entrepreneurs, it is also needed that this purchase
is resilient to attempts at cream-skimming. In our model, this resilience is provided by the non-
exclusive environment in which the purchase is carried out. In this sense, and contrary to common
results in environments of asymmetric information, welfare is enhanced by enabling entrepreneurs
to engage in unmonitored trades.
The literature most closely related to this paper is the one dealing with the eﬃciency proper-
ties of competitive equilibria under adverse selection. Bisin and Gottardi (2006) and Rustichini
and Siconolﬁ (2003, 2004) most clearly pose the problem in terms of consumption externalities
arising from the incentive compatibility constraint. Bisin and Gottardi also propose a particular
mechanism to deal with the problem: if the problem is one of externalities, they say, it can be
solved by introducing markets that allow agents to internalize them. Their mechanism requires the
introduction of consumption rights for each type of agent. In the context of our environment, this
means that if an entrepreneur wants to borrow a certain amount as a good borrower, he must also
provide a certain amount of “good-borrower rights”. If these rights are initially distributed among
the population in the appropriate manner, and if markets are created in which these rights can be
traded, Bisin and Gottardi show that eﬃciency can be attained in equilibrium. The present paper
diﬀers from their work in two dimensions. On the one hand, our result is admittedly less general,
since it applies to problems of adverse selection in credit markets in which collateral is a useful
screening device. On the other hand, though, our result shows that eﬃciency in such a setting can
be attained through the use of competitive markets alone, without the need of intervention by a
central planner to setup and manage a particular mechanism.
In its modeling approach, this paper draws mostly from Martin (2009), which is in turn closely
related to the strategic models of competition under adverse selection. The modeling of the market
for bank loans, in which intermediaries compete by designing contracts, is in the tradition of the
screening literature derived from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and
Bester (1985, 1987). A key diﬀerence between our setting and most of those analyzed by previous
papers is that we allow for a concave investment function so that the size of projects is determined
3endogenously in equilibrium.1 This feature is crucial since it allows entrepreneurs to be screened
through the amounts of collateral that they provide and of investment that they undertake.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the baseline model of the credit
market and characterize its equilibrium. Section 4 shows that the equilibrium is ineﬃcient and
illustrates diﬀerent interventions by a central planner that could achieve constrained eﬃciency.
Finally, Section 5 shows how constrained eﬃciency can be attained as a competitive equilibrium
when the economy is modiﬁed through the introduction of an additional market.
2 The Baseline Model
Assume an economy that is populated by a continuum of consumers and entrepreneurs. There
are two periods indexed by t ∈ {0,1}, that we refer to as Today and Tomorrow. All agents are
risk-neutral and have monotonic preferences over the economy’s only consumption good Tomorrow,
although the economy’s only endowment is in terms of the consumption good Today. The economic
problem that we are considering, then, is that of transforming goods Today into consumption
Tomorrow in the most eﬃcient way.
To do so, agents in our economy have two options. They may use a storage technology that
yields one unit of the consumption good Tomorrow for every unit stored Today. Alternatively,
they may use a productive technology that produces Tomorrow’s good by using Today’s good as
an input. We will make assumptions so that it is always in principle beneﬁcial for the economy to
simultaneously use the storage and production technologies. The latter, though, can be operated
solely by entrepreneurs, and it may therefore be subject to informational frictions. Assumptions
on technology are as follows:
Assumption 1 (Productive Technology). Entrepreneurs, which are uniformly distributed in the
interval [0,1], may be either of type B (“Bad”) or G (“Good”) depending on the productivity of
their technology. Entrepreneurs of each type are distributed over intervals of length λj, j ∈ {B,G},
where λG + λB = 1. An entrepreneur of type j has a successful (unsuccessful) state tomorrow with
probability pj (1 − pj), where pG > pB. If successful (unsuccessful), an entrepreneur of type j who
invests I units of the consumption good Today obtains a gross return of αjf(I) (zero) Tomorrow,
where αB > αG and pGαG > pBαB. It is assumed that f( ) is increasing, concave, and satisﬁes
Inada conditions.
Note that the technological assumptions are similar to those commonly used in the credit
rationing literature, namely second-order stochastic dominance (SOSD). The only diﬀerence is that,
1In this regard, our environment is closest to the one analyzed by Besanko and Thakor (1987).
4in the present setup, the B technology is not just a mean-preserving spread of its G counterpart but
actually has a lower expected return. This assumption allows the technologies to be unambiguously
ranked.
Entrepreneurs are endowed with an amount W of the consumption good Today, which they
cannot use to ﬁnance their production.2 In order to do so they need to borrow funds from consumers,
which they do indirectly through banks. Banks are ﬁnite in number and they act as intermediaries
that collect deposits from consumers and entrepreneurs and oﬀer loan contracts to the latter. Banks
are assumed to be risk neutral and competitive: on the deposit side, they take the gross interest
factor on deposits r as given and they compete on the loan market by designing contracts that take
the following form:
Assumption 2 (Loan Contracts). Entrepreneurs and banks sign a contract of the form (I,R,c),
where I is the amount borrowed and invested, R is the interest factor on the loan and c is the
percentage of the loan that entrepreneurs must collateralize by using their own wealth. In the event
of a successful state, entrepreneurs pay back the amount borrowed adjusted by the interest factor:
otherwise, they default and the bank keeps the goods put up as collateral, the interest borne by them
and the residual value of the project. Finally, and since they cannot invest it directly in the project,
entrepreneurs deposit their endowment in the bank for a gross interest factor of r. This implies
that the expected proﬁt that a j-type entrepreneur obtains from loan contract (I,R,c) is given by
πj(I,R,c) = pj   [f(I) − R   I] − (1 − pj)   (c   I)   r + r   W. (1)
Since competition among banks is crucial in determining the types of contracts that are oﬀered
in equilibrium, it is important to specify how we choose to model it. For the sake of simplicity,
we will follow Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and model the credit market as a two-stage game of
screening.3 In the ﬁrst stage, banks design contracts: in the second stage, entrepreneurs apply for
these contracts and all applications are accepted. It is assumed that each bank gets the same share
of total deposits and, if they design the same contract, they get the same share and composition
of loan applications. A bank’s expected proﬁts of accepting an application for a contract (I,R,c)
2This assumption is introduced to simplify the exposition, but it is not restrictive. The contracts that we study,
which entail collateral, could be rewritten as contracts in which entrepreneurs invest in their projects and banks
provide additional funds. We adopt the former characterization because it makes contracts easier to analize, it
delivers a more tractable framework and it encompasses the cases in which entrepreneurial wealth can or cannot be
directly invested.
3None of our main results would change if we modeled perfectly competitive and atomistic credit markets in which
contracts are traded, as in Gale (1992), Geanakoplos and Dubey (2002), and Martin (2007). We provide a brief
discussion of this in Section 5.1.
5from an entrepreneur of type j are given by
pj   (R   I) + (1 − pj)   (c   I) − r   I. (2)
3 Conventional Wisdom
Up to here, we have explained the main features of our benchmark economy.4 We now characterize
what, according to conventional wisdom, would be the equilibria of this economy with and without
asymmetric information. Before doing so, we provide the reader with a brief intuition for the
analysis that follows.
In the adverse selection literature, two assumptions are crucial when modeling competition
through screening. The ﬁrst is a condition of no cross-subsidization (henceforth, NCS), by which
banks are not allowed to oﬀer contracts that lose money in expectation. This assumption is crucial
for the existence of equilibrium because, if banks are allowed to engage in cross-subsidization, it will
typically be possible for them to attract all entrepreneurs by designing an incentive compatible menu
of contracts that entails transfers from some types of contracts to others. But this allocation, as our
introductory discussion suggests, cannot be sustained in equilibrium. The second assumption that
is crucial is that of exclusivity (E), by which entrepreneurs can apply to at most one of the contracts
oﬀered. This assumption, which implicitly guarantees that banks can monitor contract applications
made by entrepreneurs, is what makes screening possible in the ﬁrst place. Without knowing the
total amount of credit that an entrepreneur obtains in equilibrium, it would be impossible for a
bank to design incentive-compatible contracts.
Keeping this in mind, we characterize the equilibrium of our economy under these two assump-
tions. We then show the reader that this equilibrium is ineﬃcient and that the NCS condition lies
at the heart of this ineﬃciency. Indeed, if we allow the planner to cross-subsidize among diﬀerent
types of contracts, it is always able to outperform the competitive equilibrium. This is exactly
the intuition behind the result of Bisin and Gottardi (2006): one could think of their mechanism
as a way to relax the NCS condition in equilibrium. But what happens instead if we maintain
the assumption of exclusivity among bank contracts, while allowing entrepreneurs to borrow from
other sources as well? After all, it seems unrealistic to assume that entrepreneurs must obtain all
of their funds from a single source. This is in essence the approach that we adopt in the current
paper: although we preserve the existence of an exclusive market for bank loans, we introduce an
additional non-exclusive source of funds for entrepreneurs. As we will show, this dimension suﬃces
4This setup is essentially identical to the one developed in Martin (2009). Hence, whenever possible, we omit
formal proofs of some of the arguments and refer the interested reader to that paper.
6to achieve eﬃciency in equilibrium.
3.1 Full-information equilibrium







)} denote the equilibrium contracts under full information, it is
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for j ∈ {G,B}.
Hence, under full information, good entrepreneurs invest more than bad ones and banks break
even in both contracts. It is important to note that, in this case, investment is independent of
entrepreneurial wealth W. If entrepreneurs have no wealth, they will simply repay everything in




for j ∈ {G,B}.5 To simplify the exposition, we
henceforth assume that the total amount of resources in the economy is large enough so that the
gross risk-free interest rate r is always determined by the return to the storage technology and
therefore equal to one.6
What changes once asymmetric information is introduced? In such a scenario, banks do not
know whether a particular applicant is good or bad. They may then ﬁnd it optimal to screen
applicants by designing diﬀerent contracts that attract diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs. In our
environment, there are two dimensions along which entrepreneurs can be screened, namely; (a)
the size of the loan and; (b) the rate of collateralization.7 In order to diﬀerentiate good from
bad entrepreneurs, banks might oﬀer contracts that require good entrepreneurs to distort their
investment. Likewise, they may oﬀer contracts that require higher rates of collateralization: these
contracts will be more appealing to good than to bad entrepreneurs, since the former have a higher
probability of success and are therefore less likely to lose pledged collateral.
As is usually the case in models of adverse selection, any equilibrium must correspond to the
Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation. If this allocation is dominated by a pooling contract, the
model has no equilibrium. In the next section, we characterize the separating equilibrium of our
economy and analyze the conditions under which it fails to exist.
5To be precise, the economy under full information displays many equilibria. Indeed, banks are indiﬀerent between
making entrepreneurs pay only in the event of success (i.e., setting c
j = 0) and making them pay partially in the
event of success and partially in the event of failure (i.e., setting c
j > 0). All of these equilibria entail the same level
of investment and are therefore equivalent in terms of the equilibrium allocation.
6This assumption requires that the amount of consumption goods Today exceed the highest possible amount of
investment. None of our results depend on it.
7Once that rate of collateralization is chosen, the contractual rate of interest is immediately determined by banks’
zero-proﬁt condition.
73.2 Equilibrium under asymmetric information
Under assumptions (E) and (NCS), a separating equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. For a given level of entrepreneurial wealth W, a separating equilibrium is a set of
contracts CSEP(W) = {(IB,RB,cB),(IG,RG,cG)} satisfying the following conditions:
1. Feasibility: contracts must respect the collateralization constraint,
cj ∈ [0,
W
Ij ] for j ∈ {B,G}. (3)
2. Incentive Compatibility: each entrepreneur applies to the contract designed for his type,
πj(Ij,Rj,cj) ≥ πj(Ii,Ri,ci) for i  = j, i,j ∈ {B,G}. (4)
3. Zero proﬁt condition for banks: each contract must yield banks zero proﬁts in expectation,
1 = pj   Rj + (1 − pj)   cj for j ∈ {B,G}. (5)
4. No bank can proﬁt by oﬀering alternative contracts.
Conditions (3)-(5) are standard: note simply that (5) stems from bank competition together
with no cross-subsidization. Clearly, since banks compete to attract good entrepreneurs, a separat-
ing equilibrium requires that the proﬁts of these entrepreneurs are maximized subject to conditions
(3)-(5). The resulting contracts are characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For a given level of entrepreneurial wealth W, the separating equilibrium of our


















Proof. See Martin (2009).
Condition (6) implies that — at equilibrium — contracts taken by bad entrepreneurs entail no
distortions. Thus, they are lent the amount that is eﬃcient given the interest rate and they have
8no need to provide collateral. It is therefore on the contracts taken by good entrepreneurs that the
interest of the equilibrium lies, since these contracts must be incentive compatible. What are the
properties of these contracts?
First of all, suppose that entrepreneurs have no wealth, so that the use of collateral is impossible.
In that case, the only way of preventing bad entrepreneurs from applying to the good contract
is by suﬃciently restricting the amount of investment allowed by the latter. In the absence of
entrepreneurial wealth, then, separation requires rationing the investment of good entrepreneurs
relative to the full-information economy.
Separation through the rationing of investment, though, is clearly costly. What if entrepreneurs
have some positive level of wealth? In that case, eﬃcient screening requires that good entrepreneurs
pledge all of their wealth as collateral: this is of no cost to them, whereas it raises the cost of funds for
bad entrepreneurs because they lose this collateral more often. As entrepreneurial wealth increases,
then, an increasing fraction of the screening will take place through higher rates of collateralization
and a decreasing fraction of it will take place through the distortion of investment. Eventually, if
entrepreneurial wealth increases enough, it reaches a level W∗ that enables good entrepreneurs to
separate themselves only by providing collateral.
Our previous analysis suggests that separation is very costly for good entrepreneurs when W
is low, and becomes less costly when W is high. And, when separation is costly, our economy as
stated so far might fail to have an equilibrium. This will be the case whenever there is a pooling
allocation that Pareto dominates the separating allocation of Proposition 1. The reason is the usual
one in models of screening: if a pooling allocation Pareto dominates the separating equilibrium,
then banks can proﬁtably deviate from the latter to the former while attracting all entrepreneurs.
But the pooling allocation can never be an equilibrium either: once in it, banks always have an
incentive to engage in cream-skimming by designing a deviating contract that proﬁtably lures good
entrepreneurs away from the pool.8
Indeed, it can be formally shown that — provided that the proportion of good entrepreneurs in
the economy is suﬃciently high — a separating equilibrium will fail to exist in our economy whenever
entrepreneurial wealth is low. In particular, there is a well-deﬁned function W(r) that determines,
for each interest rate, the minimum level of entrepreneurial wealth that is necessary in order for
an equilibrium to exist.9 If the mix of entrepreneurs in the economy is suﬃciently high, however,
W(r) > 0 for all r and an equilibrium fails to exist whenever W = 0. The following lemma, adapted
8In particular, banks could lure good entrepreneurs away from the pool by oﬀering contracts that entail less
investment and lower interest rate payments than the pooling contract.
9Naturally, W
′(r) < 0, since high interest rates lead to low levels of equilibrium investment and hence separation
can be attained with relatively low levels of wealth
9from Martin (2009), establishes this formally:
Lemma 1. Let ¯ p = λGpG + λBpB denote the average probability of success of all entrepreneurs in
the economy. If ¯ p > ¯ p0 =
αBpB
αG , then the separating allocation of Proposition 1 is always dominated
by a pooling allocation when W = 0. In this case, our economy fails to have an equilibrium.
4 Welfare-enhancing interventions by the planner
Consider the baseline economy analyzed so far. In particular, assume an economy in which ¯ p > ¯ p0
and W = 0.10 According to the previous analysis, such an economy does not have an equilibrium.
Consider a central planner that seeks to maximize social welfare subject to an incentive compati-
bility constraint: its problem can then be interpreted as the constrained maximization of G proﬁts.
Such a planner, even if subject to constraints (E) and (NCS), can clearly oﬀer pooling contracts
whenever these dominate the separating equilibrium. But there is even more that a planner can
do. Indeed, there is no reason for which it cannot engage in cross-subsidization between diﬀerent
types of contracts. It is well known that, by doing so, it can typically increase welfare beyond what
can be attained through pure pooling or separating allocations. We now explore some of these
alternatives.
4.1 Transfers: relaxing NCS
Consider ﬁrst the case of a planner that, besides oﬀering diﬀerent contracts, is able to resort to
direct transfers to cross-subsidize between them. One way to do this is simply to collect resources
from applicants to the G contract in order to distribute them among applicants to the B contract.
Since we restrict ourselves to the case in which W = 0, though, this cannot be done directly. What
the planner can do, however, is to increase the interest payments charged to entrepreneurs who
apply to the G contract in order to distribute the proceeds among entrepreneurs applying to the B
contract. We refer to such a scheme as a direct-transfer scheme. Under such a scheme, and letting
T stand for the (ﬁxed) surcharge charged to applicants to the G contract in the event of success,
10The assumption by which W = 0 is made to simplify the exposition and is not necessary for our results. In the
current section, we consider diﬀerent schemes through which the planner can engage in cross-subsidization between
diﬀerent contracts: since entrepreneurs have no wealth, the optimal degree of cross-subsidization is fully undertaken
with borrowed resources, i.e. through credit. If entrepreneurs had some positive level of wealth, a fraction of the
optimal cross-subsidization would be undertaken directly with entrepreneurial resources, while the remaining part
would be undertaken through credit in the form that we analyze below.
10the planner’s problem may be formulated as follows:
max
IG,IB,T




pGrIG − TpB ≤ αBpBf(IB) − rIB + T
λGpG
λB , (9)





where Equations (9) and (10), which already incorporate a zero-proﬁt constraint for the planner,
respectively represent the incentive compatibility constraints of bad and good entrepreneurs. The
following Lemma characterizes the solution to the planner’s problem.
Proposition 2. Consider our baseline economy when W = 0 and ¯ p > ¯ p0. Under a direct transfer
scheme, the allocation chosen by the planner entails a positive transfer   T > 0. Moreover, such an
allocation entails an investment of   Ij by entrepreneurs of type j ∈ {B,G}, where   Ij is deﬁned by:
  IB = IB∗
f′(  IG) =
r
pGαG − (αB − αG)pB λB
λG
This allocation Pareto dominates the competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that the competitive equilibrium of our economy can always be improved
upon if the central planner can resort to transfers. The intuition for this result is as follows: if the
planner can cross-subsidize between diﬀerent contracts, it can ask applicants to the G contract for
a ﬁxed fee in the event of success, the proceeds of which are then distributed among applicants
to the B contract. If the proportion of good to bad types in the economy is high (in particular,
so as to satisfy ¯ p > ¯ p0), such a mechanism demands few resources from each good entrepreneur
whereas it increases the cost of mimicking for bad entrepreneurs. In other words, such a scheme
enables good entrepreneurs to make a payment in order to “relax” their incentive constraint.11
Clearly, this solution always outperforms the separating equilibrium of Proposition 1. But it also
outperforms a pure pooling allocation because, whereas the latter requires bad entrepreneurs to
overinvest relative to their eﬃcient level of investment, the use of cross-subsidization avoids this
11In particular — under the direct transfer scheme — each marginal increase in T increases the cost of G types by
p




11distortion while nonetheless expanding investment by good entrepreneurs.12
The planner intervention analyzed in this section lends itself to a very natural interpretation.
We remind the reader that, according to Bisin and Gottardi (2006) and others, the problem of
adverse selection can be thought of as a consumption externality. In our setting, bad entrepreneurs
constrain the choices of their good counterparts through the incentive compatibility constraint:
since they do not internalize this eﬀect, competitive equilibria are ineﬃcient. According to this
logic, the ineﬃciency could be eliminated if only good entrepreneurs could pay the bad ones to
internalize the externality that they generate. But this is exactly what the separating contracts
with transfers allow, making it possible for good entrepreneurs to “pay” those who apply to the
bad loan contract. This relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of loan contracts and allows
good entrepreneurs to expand their investment in equilibrium.
4.2 Credit lines and collateral: preserving NCS with additional funds
As has been shown, a central planner can outperform the competitive equilibrium of our economy
by engaging in direct transfers among diﬀerent contracts. We now show that there is an alternative
way in which the planner can achieve the same level of investment. It consists in ﬁrst lending
money to all entrepreneurs and then requiring applicants to G contracts to pledge these resources
as collateral. This essentially amounts to splitting the loan in two. First, entrepreneurs have access
to an “oﬃcial credit line” from which they can draw funds and, second, they apply to separating
contracts like the ones described in Proposition 1. The interesting aspect of this scheme is that, as
we later argue, it is fully compatible with maintaining the assumption of NCS.
We refer to this scheme as a loan-collateralization scheme. In it, the planner ﬁrst oﬀers to lend
all entrepreneurs an amount WT through a credit line: in order to break even, it charges an interest
rate of (1/p) per unit of credit provided in the event of success. It then oﬀers separating contracts
in the manner of Proposition 1. The existence of the ﬁrst loan, though, now makes it possible for
entrepreneurs to pledge up to WT as collateral when applying to these contracts. Under such a
12In fact, note that G proﬁts must necessarily increase with respect to the pooling allocation, since the planner
could always choose to implement the latter with the appropriate transfers and loans.
12scheme, the planner’s problem may be formulated as follows:
max
IG,IB,WT
















WT ≤ αBpBf(IB) − rIB, (11)
αGpGf(IG) − rIG ≥ αGpGf(IB) −
pG
pBIB, (12)
where Equations (9) and (10) represent the respective incentive compatibility constraints of B and
G entrepreneurs when applying to the separating contracts. The following Lemma characterizes
the solution to the planner’s problem.
Proposition 3. Consider our baseline economy when W = 0 and ¯ p > ¯ p0. Under a loan-
collateralization scheme, the allocation chosen by the planner entails a positive loan through the
credit line WT =   W > 0. Moreover, such an allocation entails an investment of   Ij by entrepre-
neurs of type j ∈ {B,G}, where   Ij is deﬁned by:
  IB = IB∗
f′(  IG) =
r
pGαG − (αB − αG)pB λB
λG
Proof. See Appendix.
Relative to the separating contracts of Proposition 1, bad entrepreneurs beneﬁt from the loan-





.13 How about good entrepreneurs? Once again, since the marginal cost of the funds
it provides is eﬀectively equal to
 
pG/¯ p − 1
 
, the planner’s ﬁrst loan might not seem like a good
idea for them. On the other hand, though, it beneﬁts these entrepreneurs indirectly by increasing
their resources at the time of applying to the loan contracts. Since good entrepreneurs are more
willing than bad ones to pledge them as collateral, these additional resources enable them to obtain
better contractual terms. Ultimately, the ratio between the cost of increasing WT and the beneﬁt
it reports by increasing the cost of mimicking for B types is exactly the same as the corresponding
ratios under the direct transfer scheme. Hence, the planner is able to achieve the same level of
investment under the former than under the latter.
13Although the loan-collaterlaization scheme always increases the expected proﬁts of entrepreneurs with bad
projects, it must be veriﬁed that these always have enough resources to fulﬁll their obligations in the event of
success (see Appendix).
13What is going on? From an economic perspective, the loan-collateralization scheme enables
good entrepreneurs to “buy” an eﬃcient screening technology. In this model, good entrepreneurs
can be screened by distorting their investment or by pledging wealth as collateral: of the two,
the latter is costless whereas the former is not. If the initial problem is one of scarcity of the
resource that allows for eﬃcient screening, the planner can help by allowing good entrepreneurs to
purchase more of it. Although directly costly because they must pay a premium for these additional
funds, the intervention is indirectly beneﬁcial for good entrepreneurs because it enables them to be
screened more eﬃciently by banks: in other words, the beneﬁts of improved screening are higher
than its cost.
Before concluding our description of the loan-collateralization scheme, we remind the reader
that it attains the same level of investment as the direct transfer scheme. Given that this is
the case, why have we bothered in characterizing both? The reason is that they diﬀer in one
crucial aspect. The direct transfer scheme requires the planner to oﬀer separating contracts with
cross-subsidization, and it is therefore not decentralizable as a competitive equilibrium: in the
terminology of the introduction, it suﬀers from the problems of cross-subsidization and cream-
skimming. The loan-collateralization scheme, however, is resilient to these problems. In the ﬁrst
stage there is cross-subsidization but no separation, since the planner lends the same amount to all
entrepreneurs. In the second stage, there is separation but no cross-subsidization, since the planner
oﬀers a pair of separating contracts designed in the manner of Proposition 1. In principle, then,
there is promise that such a scheme can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. And this is
where we turn our attention next.
5 Eﬃciency restored: the case of the missing market
We are now ready to show our main result. We do so by modifying the baseline economy of Section
2: while we preserve competition among our original banks under the assumptions of exclusivity
and no cross-subsidization, we introduce a new ﬁnancial market in which entrepreneurs can raise
additional resources. We henceforth refer to the original credit market as the “exclusive market”,
and to the new ﬁnancial market as the “non-exclusive market”.
As in the exclusive market, competition in the non-exclusive market is modeled as a two-stage
game of screening a la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In this market, N non-exclusive intermediaries
collect deposits from savers and compete to lend resources to entrepreneurs.14 In the ﬁrst stage,
14Exactly as banks in the exclusive market, non-exclusive intermediaries are assumed to be risk neutral and com-
petitive: on the deposit side, they take the gross interest factor on deposits as given and they compete on the loan
market by designing contracts.
14these intermediaries design contracts (I,R,c), in the second stage entrepreneurs apply to these
contracts and all applications are accepted. This market, then, looks exactly like its exclusive
counterpart, with one crucial diﬀerence: entrepreneurs are allowed to simultaneously apply to
contracts oﬀered by diﬀerent intermediaries. It can be therefore be thought of as a market in which
it is diﬃcult for contract providers to monitor an agent’s trades, so that exclusivity is impossible
to enforce. We make the natural assumption that each non-exclusive intermediary can nonetheless
monitor an individual agent’s application to its own contract, so that it is impossible for any given
entrepreneur to apply more than once to a contract oﬀered by an individual intermediary. The
reader can therefore think of our modiﬁed economy as consisting of a ﬁrst set of markets in which
all trades can be observed and veriﬁed, and a second set of markets in which individuals can engage
in hidden trades.15
As for the timing of the non-exclusive market, we assume that it opens Today after contracts
are posted — but before applications take place — in the exclusive market. In other words, com-
petition in credit markets Today is now assumed to work as follows: (i) contracts are posted in
exclusive markets; (ii) contracts are posted in non-exclusive markets; (iii) entrepreneurs apply to
non-exclusive contracts, and all applications are accepted, and; (iv) entrepreneurs apply to exclu-
sive contracts, and all applications are accepted.16 An equilibrium of the modiﬁed economy is thus
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. Given our modiﬁed economy with W = 0 and ¯ p > ¯ p0, an equilibrium is de-








1. Exclusive contracts satisfy the feasibility, incentive-compatibility and zero-proﬁt conditions
laid out in Deﬁnition 1.
2. Non-exclusive contracts satisfy feasibility and the zero-proﬁt condition of non-exclusive inter-
mediaries.
3. No exclusive bank or non-exclusive intermediary can proﬁt by oﬀering alternative contracts.
15We wish to stress one important fact to the reader: the establishment of a non-exclusive market like the one just
described does not require changing any of the informational or technological assumptions of our economy. In fact,
these contracts display the same level of contingency as exclusive contracts oﬀered by banks and are not therefore
“new” assets in any fundamental way.
16As is commonly the case in economies of adverse selection, this timing is not innocuous, and the precise manner
in which competition is modelled will aﬀect the type of competitive equilibrium that emerges. One appealing feature
of this timing, though, is that it is consistent with our contracts being optimal. In particular, non-exclusive inter-
mediaries cannot condition their contracts on the applications entrepreneurs make in the exclusive market, because
these happen after non-exclusive credit is allocated.
15Before proceeding to show our main results, there are two important observations regarding any
equilibrium of our modiﬁed economy. First, as implicitly stated in Deﬁnition 2, any credit provided
through the exclusive market must in the form of separating contracts: as mentioned earlier,
no equilibrium can pool entrepreneurs in these contracts, since this would provide incentives for
proﬁtable deviations through cream-skimming. Second, in any equilibrium in which some credit is
provided through non-exclusive contracts, these must be of the pooling type. Indeed, besides trivial




, there can be no separation in these contracts: if there was any such separation,
bad entrepreneurs would always have an incentive to mimic their good counterparts in order to be
cross-subsidized.
In sum, any equilibrium of our modiﬁed economy in which credit is granted through both,
exclusive and non-exclusive markets, must entail separation in the former and pooling in the latter.
Why then, do G entrepreneurs bother to raise funds at all in non-exclusive market? The reason, as
we have mentioned in the previous section, is that non-exclusive borrowing provides resources to
be used as collateral in the exclusive ﬁnancial market. In fact, as we now show, the combination of
these two markets makes it possible to attain the constrained optimal allocation as a competitive
equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Consider our modiﬁed economy when W = 0 and ¯ p > ¯ p0. The constrained optimal
allocation characterized in Proposition 3 can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium of this
economy. In such an equilibrium:

























where the G contract satisﬁes incentive compatibility and the bank’s zero-proﬁt condition as
stated in Deﬁnition 1.
3. An entrepreneur of type j ∈ {B,G} applies to all the non-exclusive contracts, and to one
exclusive contract from the pair in Equation (14) corresponding to his type.
Proof. See Appendix.
16The competitive equilibrium described in Proposition 4 reproduces the allocation attained
through the loan-collateralization scheme described in the previous section. In this equilibrium, all
entrepreneurs borrow a total of   W units from the non-exclusive market. While bad entrepreneurs
simply keep these resources, good entrepreneurs pledge them as collateral when applying to the
separating contracts oﬀered by the exclusive banks.
Given the contracts oﬀered, this is the optimal strategy for all entrepreneurs. Bad entrepreneurs
borrow from the non-exclusive market at a proﬁt because they do so at a cross-subsidized rate of
interest. Good entrepreneurs, by deﬁnition of the constrained optimal allocation, maximize their
proﬁts by using both markets in order to expand their overall level of borrowing and investment.
It remains to be shown, however, that there are no proﬁtable deviations for contract designers.
Note ﬁrst that, in the equilibrium of Proposition 4, no individual contract is expected to yield
negative proﬁts. Hence, as we have already anticipated in our discussion of the loan-collateralization
scheme, the equilibrium is resilient to the problem of cross-subsidization, i.e. to deviations that
entail the withdrawal of contracts by their designers. Any deviation, then, must be associated to
the problem of cream-skimming, i.e. it must entail the design of alternative contracts that attract
only good entrepreneurs. In the case of non-exclusive intermediaries, such deviation is clearly non-
existent. There is no way in which they can make proﬁts by seeking to attract good entrepreneurs:
given the non-exclusive nature of their contracts, any funds that they oﬀer at an interest rate below
(1/pB) will attract bad entrepreneurs as well.
The crucial part of the argument, then, consists in showing that there are no proﬁtable devia-
tions for exclusive banks either. After all, the standard arguments for cream-skimming would seem
to apply to our modiﬁed economy as well. In the equilibrium of Proposition 4, it is directly costly
for good entrepreneurs to borrow from the non-exclusive market but beneﬁcial for bad entrepre-
neurs to do so. What prevents exclusive banks from designing G contracts that entail a smaller
loan size but require a lower level of collateral — and hence of cross-subsidization — as well? Why
doesn’t such a deviation, which destroys the pooling equilibrium in our baseline economy, destroy
the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 4?
The answer is that, in the eﬃcient equilibrium outlined above, all cross-subsidization is under-
taken through non-exclusive markets. This simple feature drastically limits the type of proﬁtable
deviations that exclusive banks can design. To see this, consider a pooling allocation in our baseline
economy: such an allocation cannot be an equilibrium because good entrepreneurs can be lured
away from it. But this is only possible because contracts are exclusive: bad entrepreneurs, when
deciding whether to follow good entrepreneurs in their deviation, know that doing so requires them
to give up the cross-subsidization that they obtain in the pooling allocation. Simply put, bad entre-
17preneurs must choose: they either stay at the pooling and receive the beneﬁts of cross-subsidization
or they follow good entrepreneurs in their deviation. In the equilibrium of Proposition 4, though,
this reasoning does not apply. Since exclusive banks cannot monitor what entrepreneurs do in the
non-exclusive market, they cannot condition their contracts on such actions. At most, they can
require an applicant to show up with a certain level of collateralizable resources in order access a
given contract. This makes it very diﬃcult to attract only good entrepreneurs by designing con-
tracts that entail less investment but also require less collateral: now, bad entrepreneurs can do
both, follow the good ones in their deviation and obtain cross-subsidization in the non-exclusive
market.
Indeed, as we show in the Appendix, any attempt at cream-skimming on behalf of exclusive
banks will ultimately attract all entrepreneurs. The reason is as follows: suppose that an exclusive
bank oﬀers a separating contract that entails a lower level of investment but requires a lower level
of collateral as well. If designed properly, such a contract will be attractive to good entrepreneurs
because it will enable them to borrow less from the non-exclusive market, which is costly for them.
However, any such contract will necessarily also be attractive to bad entrepreneurs, since it enables
them to keep the resources   W that they obtain in the non-exclusive market without requiring them
to fully pledge these resources as collateral, which is costly for them. To clarify the argument, we
also show in the Appendix that the inability to contract on the non-exclusive trades lies at the heart
of the argument. If this restriction is lifted, bad entrepreneurs would have to choose between being
cross-subsidized in the non-exclusive market or following good entrepreneurs in their deviation,
the standard cream-skimming argument would apply once more, and the eﬃcient equilibrium of
Proposition 4 would unravel.
This result, and the logic that underlies it, is somewhat surprising. It implies that, contrary
to what is commonly thought regarding environments of asymmetric information, allowing agents
to engage hidden trades might be welfare-enhancing in the presence of adverse selection.17 In our
setup, hidden trades are beneﬁcial because they restrict the type of deviations that can be designed
by exclusive banks, which are ultimately at the heart of the traditional ineﬃciency result. In a
sense, then, the presence of the non-exclusive market “disciplines” its exclusive counterpart and
buttresses the existence of an eﬃcient equilibrium.18
17For an analysis of how hidden trading might be problematic in environments of moral hazard, see Bisin and
Guaitioli (2004).
18In this sense, our result is related to the literature that stresses the possible role of hidden trades in disciplining
governments. See, for example, Bisin and Rampini (2006).
185.1 Discussion
Overall, the constrained optimal allocation in the economy requires some separation and some
cross-subsidization. In Section 4.2, we argued that this allocation could be attained through a
loan-collateralization scheme. Such a scheme entailed both cross-subsidization and separation, but
never in the same loan: the planner would pool all entrepreneurs in a ﬁrst loan, and it would then
separate them through standard contracts. It is this feature of the scheme that allows it to be
decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. Such an equilibrium entails pooling of all entrepreneurs
in the non-exclusive market. Any proceeds obtained in this market, though, are pledged as collateral
in the market for exclusive loan contracts in order to achieve separation.
We have shown that there is an equilibrium of the modiﬁed economy that attains constrained
eﬃciency, but are there other equilibria? Without providing a formal treatment of this question, we
conjecture that the answer depends crucially on what is assumed regarding price-taking behavior
by exclusive contract designers. In particular, if these anticipate the eﬀects of their posted contracts
on the working of the non-exclusive market, the unique equilibrium is indeed the one characterized
in Proposition 4.
To see this, note ﬁrst that entrepreneurs must necessarily borrow from the non-exclusive market
in any equilibrium of our economy with W = 0 and ¯ p > ¯ p0. If they do not, we are back in the
case of the baseline economy, which fails to have an equilibrium. Hence, the only way in which an
equilibrium can diﬀer from the eﬃcient one of Proposition 4 is by entailing too much or too little
cross-subsidization in the non-exclusive market.
Suppose, for example, that exclusive banks expect each non-exclusive intermediary to oﬀer a









for W(r) < W0 <   W, where W(r) is deﬁned as in Section 3.2. In this case, cross-subsidization in
the non-exclusive market is expected to be ineﬃciently low, and exclusive banks do not have an
incentive to oﬀer the separating contract that requires   W units of collateral. There is, however,
an equilibrium in which exclusive intermediaries post G contracts that require W0 units of collat-
eral and entrepreneurs eﬀectively borrow this amount from non-exclusive intermediaries. By the
same token, it is possible to construct equilibria in which — relative to the eﬃcient equilibrium —
entrepreneurs borrow too much from the non-exclusive market.
These equilibria, though, can only survive if exclusive banks take non-exclusive contracts as
given. If they anticipate the eﬀect of their own contracts on those oﬀered by non-exclusive inter-
mediaries, however, only the eﬃcient equilibrium survives. Take the example with ineﬃciently low
19cross-subsidization developed above: if an exclusive bank happens to post the separating contract
requiring   W units of collateral, the non-exclusive intermediaries will have an incentive to provide
  W units of credit. But, anticipating this, an exclusive bank will in fact have the incentive to deviate
and post the aforementioned contract. A similar argument rules out equilibria in which the degree
of cross-subsidization in non-exclusive market is ineﬃciently high.
This discussion only highlights what Hellwig (1987) has already stressed: the way in which com-
petition is modeled is crucial in determining the set of equilibria in economies of adverse selection.
Regardless of the particular modeling choice that is made, though, the main ﬁnding of this paper
remains valid. Suppose, for example, that instead of modeling the exclusive and non-exclusive mar-
kets as games of screening à la Rothschild-Stiglitz, we had modeled them both as a set of perfectly
competitive markets in which all possible contracts could be traded. In such a setting, exclusive and
non-exclusive contracts would be traded simultaneously. Would the constrained optimal allocation
be an equilibrium of such an economy? If in equilibrium agents trade exclusive contracts as in
Equation (14), it is clearly optimal for them to borrow   W from the non-exclusive market according
to Equation (13). But if entrepreneurs raise   W in the non-exclusive market according to Equation
(13), the only equilibrium in the contract markets will be one in which agents trade contracts as in
Equation (14). This last statement follows directly from the ﬁndings of Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2002), who showed that — when modeled in a fully competitive fashion — models of screening à
la Rothschild-Stiglitz have a unique equilibrium that corresponds to the separating equilibrium of
Proposition 1.19’20
In the presence of adverse selection in the credit market, then, the competitive equilibrium
will typically be ineﬃcient. It is well known that there is a welfare-enhancing intervention by the
planner that consists in directly cross-subsidizing some contracts at the expense of others. We have
shown that the same allocation can be attained by an alternative scheme that consists in lending
funds to entrepreneurs and then oﬀering separating contracts that rely only on collateralization.
This last scheme, though, can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium in a very natural way.
The only reason for which this has been thought to be unfeasible in standard models of adverse
selection in the credit market is because of the assumption by which entrepreneurs can only borrow
19Once again, we have chosen not to pursue this modeling alternative in order to simplify the exposition as much
as possible. Modeling competitive markets for contracts as in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), for example, requires
the explicit introduction of oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs. While the substance of our argument would be fundamentally
unchanged, developing it properly in such a setting would require the reader to pay greater attention to notation and
to technical considerations.
20A caveat is in order. Whereas the exact manner in which the exclusive and non-exclusive markets are modeled
is not really important for our main result, the timing in which they operate might be. If both markets are assumed
to be simultaneous, for example, the contracts that we consider may no longer be optimal. In particular, it might
be optimal for non-exclusive intermediaries to make their contracts contingent on the actions that entrepreneurs
undertake in the exclusive market. In our setting, this issue does not arise.
20from one source. If this assumption is removed, eﬃciency is attainable in equilibrium.
6 Concluding Remarks
The present paper has analyzed a standard setting of adverse selection in credit markets. In
particular, we have studied an economy in which entrepreneurs are privately informed about the
quality of their investment opportunities and they need to borrow from banks. Conventional wisdom
suggests that, in such settings, competitive equilibria will typically be ineﬃcient. The reason for this
can essentially be framed as one of externalities: under adverse selection, the incentive compatibility
constraint restricts allocations across types, so that decisions made by one type of agents constrain
the choices available to others. Achieving eﬃciency in this environment requires this externality to
be internalized: this could be done, for example, by allowing for transfers among types of agents.
Such a solution, however, cannot be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium because it requires
that some contracts yield positive expected proﬁts while other yield expected losses. Obviously,
there is no incentive to oﬀer the latter in equilibrium.
We have argued that the conventional wisdom for this class of environments rests on one implicit
assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional non-exclusive market is
added, so that entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those oﬀered by banks, we show that the
constrained eﬃcient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. We have provided an intuition
for this result: if good entrepreneurs can distinguish themselves in the eyes of banks by pledging
collateral, it might be beneﬁcial for them to raise more of it through the non-exclusive market.
Of course, doing so is costly. If entrepreneurs with good projects raise funds by borrowing from
the non-exclusive market, bad entrepreneurs also have an incentive to do so and beneﬁt from the
ensuing cross-subsidization. Good entrepreneurs, then, face a trade-oﬀ: borrowing from the non-
exclusive market is directly costly because it entails cross-subsidization of bad borrowers, but it is
indirectly beneﬁcial because it allows them to raise collateral and relax the incentive compatibility
constraint in the exclusive market for bank loans. We show that there is an equilibrium of our
economy in which this trade-oﬀ is exploited optimally to attain the eﬃcient levels of investment.
In such an equilibrium, there is pooling of all borrowers in the non-exclusive market and separation
of borrowers with diﬀerent types in the exclusive market for bank loans.
Our paper complements existing results in the literature on adverse selection by showing that,
in certain settings, it is possible to attain eﬃciency only through the interaction of standard com-
petitive markets. Admittedly, our result is substantially less general than the one of Bisin and
Gottardi (2006): whereas their ﬁndings apply to canonical problems of adverse selection, our ﬁnd-
21ings thus far are circumscribed to credit markets in which collateral can be a useful screening
device. In this sense, credit markets are particular in that they provide goods but also demand
them for screening purposes: hence, the screening technology can in a sense be provided by mar-
kets themselves. Having said this, we feel that our ﬁnding gains in simplicity and intuition what it
lacks in generality. Indeed, a general solution like the one proposed by Bisin and Gottardi (2006)
requires the intervention of a planner to design the consumption rights, instrument their use, and
distribute an initial endowment of these rights throughout the population. In our setting, though,
eﬃciency is attained simply by letting ﬁrms borrow from two diﬀerent markets at diﬀerent rates.
The mechanism by which eﬃciency is attained is simple and has realistic implications. Casual
observation suggests that ﬁrms do borrow from various sources at the same time (banks and bonds
are the simplest examples that come to mind). It remains to be seen whether the ﬁndings of this
paper, by which eﬃciency can be attained in economies of adverse selection through the interaction
of various competitive markets, can be generalized to a broader class of environments.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Direct Transfer Scheme (Proposition 2)
Taking into account his budget constraint, the planner’s problem may be formulated as follows:
max
IG,IB,T




pGIG − TpB ≤ αBpBf(IB) − IB + T
λGpG
λB





23We solve the problem by using only one incentive compatibility constraint and conjecturing that
the other one will be slack. Once we derive the optimal contracts, we will prove this conjecture
to be correct. It can be readily obtained that   IB = IB∗
. Using β to denote the multiplier on the
incentive compatibility constraints, the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to IG and T are:





λB + pB] = 0, (16)
where, in the last equality, we already incorporate the fact that any solution must entail   T > 0.
To see this, suppose that   T = 0. In this case, the incentive compatible allocation would entail
  IG < IB∗
. From Equation (15), it follows that
β =
αGpGf′(  IG) − 1

























and   IG is implicitly given by










f′(  IG) =
1
pGαG − (αB − αG)λB
λGpB
.
It remains to be shown that this allocation is incentive compatible for G entrepreneurs, so that:







Suppose that this is not the case. This implies that, in the (T,IG) space, the constrained optimal
allocation (  T,   IG) lies below the constraint given by Equation (18). But this is only possible if, at
some point, the constraint intersects the G isoproﬁt given by
αGpGf(IG) − IG − TpG = αGpGf(  IG) −   IG −   TpG,
which can clearly never happen.
247.2 Loan Collateralization Scheme (Proposition 3)




















WT ≤ αBpBf(IB) − rIB, (19)
αGpGf(IG) − rIG ≥ αGpGf(IB) −
pG
pBIB, (20)
Once again, it is immediate to see that   IB = IB∗
. Using β to denote the multiplier on the incentive
compatibility constraints, the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to IG and T are:
















where, in the last equality, we already incorporate the fact that any solution must entail   W > 0.
This can be veriﬁed through the same arguments we have invoked in the previous section. Hence,











and   IG is implicitly given by
f′(  IG) =
1
pGαG − (αB − αG)λB
λGpB
.
That, in this allocation, the incentive compatibility constraint of good entrepreneurs is slack
follows directly from observing that   IG > IB∗
.
7.3 Feasibility of the loan-collateralization scheme
It needs to be shown that entrepreneurs with bad projects, who beneﬁt from this scheme in expected
terms, have the resources to pay back the ﬁrst-stage loan in the event that they are successful.




pB   IB∗




25Replacing the expression for   W from the incentive compatibility constraint of bad entrepreneurs,
it can be shown that a suﬃcient condition for this inequality to be satisﬁed is that
αBf(IG∗
) − 1
pG   IG∗
αBf(IB∗) − 1





¯ p − pB
.
7.4 Existence of an Eﬃcient Equilibrium (Proposition 4)
As we mention in the main body of the paper, there are clearly no proﬁtable deviations for entre-
preneurs: given the contracts oﬀered, their optimal strategy is to apply to all of the non-exclusive
contracts and — in the case of good entrepreneurs — to pledge these resources as collateral when
applying to the exclusive contracts. Therefore, any deviation must emerge from contract designers
themselves.
Given the contracts posted by exclusive banks, non-exclusive intermediaries have no proﬁtable
deviations. Any contract posted by them with an interest rate lower than (1/pB) would neces-
sarily attract bad entrepreneurs, since it would be costless for them to obtain the implied cross-
subsidization. In the best of cases, then, they can hope to attract all entrepreneurs by oﬀering
contracts with an interest rate of (1/p). But, in the eﬃcient equilibrium, good entrepreneurs are
already obtaining all the funds that they desire at this rate, and so no proﬁtable deviations exist.
The subtle part of the argument therefore lies on the possible deviations of exclusive banks. Can
they design a contract (I1,R1,W1) that manages to attract only good entrepreneurs by requiring
to borrow less in the non-exclusive market? Formally, any such deviation must satisfy
αGpGf(IG
1 ) − IG

























where the last equation represents the incentive compatibility constraint of bad entrepreneurs.
Crucially,   W does not appear in this constraint since, should they choose to apply to the deviating
contract, bad entrepreneurs can still raise this amount in the non-exclusive market while only
pledging a fraction (W1/  W) of it in the exclusive market.
Taking the eﬃcient equilibrium as a starting point, any eﬀective deviation must therefore satisfy
αGpGf′(IG) − 1
pG


















       
πB=0
,
26which is impossible, since
αGpGf′(IG) − 1
pG









for all IG ≤   IG. At the constrained optimal allocation, Equation (26) holds with equality, whereas
the inequality is strict whenever IG <   IG. This proves that there exist no proﬁtable deviations for
exclusive banks, so that the constrained optimal allocation is indeed an equilibrium.
To see that this relies on the fact that it is impossible to monitor trades in the non-exclusive
market, consider that this was not the case. Then, exclusive banks could design deviations in which
entrepreneurs are required to borrow no more than W1 in the non-exclusive markets. This would












W1 ≤ αBpBf(  IG) −
pB
pG







  W, (27)
since by choosing to follow good entrepreneurs they would now have to decrease their non-exclusive
borrowing by ( ˆ W − W1). Hence, any eﬀective deviation would need to satisfy
αGpGf′(IG) − 1
pG



















       
πB=0
,
which is indeed possible at the constrained optimal allocation.
27